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UP IN THE AIR: THE CONFLICT 
SURROUNDING THE EUROPEAN 
UNION’S AVIATION DIRECTIVE AND 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF A JUDICIAL 
RESOLUTION 
INTRODUCTION 
ith a new regulatory program for aviation industry 
emissions, the European Union has brought the tension 
between trade and climate change efforts to a head. The Euro-
pean Union’s measure, the Aviation Directive (“Directive”), in-
corporates aviation into the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(“EU ETS”).1 Under the Directive, aircraft operators must pur-
chase greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emission2 allowances for any 
flight that lands or takes off from an aerodrome3 in the EU.4 
The EU incorporated aviation activities into the EU ETS 
based on its concern that GHG emissions from aviation (“avia-
tion emissions”) would frustrate emission reductions made in 
other sectors.5 Aviation is a quickly growing industry, with 2.8 
                                                                                                             
 1. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”) is a 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system that covers GHG emis-
sions from activities in the power and industry sectors. European Commis-
sion Report on The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) (Jan. 2013), 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/factsheet_ets_2013_en.pdf. The 
Aviation Directive (“Directive”) is part of a 2008 amendment to the EU ETS 
and came into effect on January 1, 2012. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, 2009 
O.J. (L 8) (EU). 
 2. Aviation emissions consist of carbon dioxide (“CO2”), water vapor, ni-
trous oxide, sulfur oxide, hydrocarbons, and black carbon particles. Environ-
mental Report 2010 – Aviation and Climate Change, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION 
ORG. [ICAO] 38 (2010), http://www.icao.int/environmental-
protection/Documents/Publications/ENV_Report_2010.pdf [hereinafter ICAO 
Environmental Report 2010]. The EU ETS regulates different greenhouse gas 
emissions for different sectors; it regulates CO2 from commercial aviation and 
energy-intensive production industries, nitrous oxide (“N2O”) from industries 
that produce certain acids, and perfluorocarbons (“PFCs”) from the aluminum 
industry. European Commission Report on The EU Emissions Trading Sys-
tem (EU ETS), supra note 1. 
 3. An aerodrome is any site at which a flight arrives or departs. Council 
Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at annex 1. 
 4. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 3, 5, 17. 
 5. Id. at 10–11. 
W
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billion passengers transported by air in 2011, a number that is 
expected to increase to 5 billion passengers by 2030.6 Aviation 
is also responsible for 35% of international trade by value, 
transporting US$5.3 trillion in cargo annually.7 While emis-
sions from aviation currently contribute 2% of global carbon 
dioxide (“CO2”) emissions, this figure is projected to increase 
300-700% by 2050.8 
In the face of failure within the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (“ICAO”)—the international standard setting 
body for aviation—to regulate aviation emissions, the EU im-
plemented the Directive to incorporate these emissions into the 
EU ETS.9 With the recognition that an EU-only program would 
be ineffective to address the aviation industry’s overall impact 
on climate change, the EU included the regulation of emissions 
from non-EU airlines in the Directive for the complete length of 
flights, including the portions that are not over EU territory.10 
                                                                                                             
 6. Thirty-seventh Session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific 
and Technological Advice (SBSTA37), Doha, Qatar, Nov. 26–Dec. 1, 2012, 
Agenda Item 11(d) Emissions from fuel used for international aviation and 
maritime transport (Submission by the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO)), ¶ 1.1 (2012) [hereinafter SBSTA 37 Agenda Item 11(d)]. 
 7. Joshua Meltzer, Climate Change and Trade – The EU Aviation Di-
rective and the WTO, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 111, 122 (2012); SBSTA 37 Agenda 
Item 11(d), supra note 6. 
 8. ICAO Environmental Report 2010, supra note 2, at 18. Non-CO2 emis-
sions consist of “carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, water vapour, sulphate and 
soot particles,” Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 19. CO2 emis-
sions from aviation are released directly into the upper troposphere and low-
er stratosphere. ICAO Environmental Report 2010, supra note 2, at 38–41. In 
combination with non-CO2 GHG emissions, their effect may double or quad-
ruple the impact of CO2 alone, exacerbating their contribution to global 
warming. Id. 
 9. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 9. The ICAO is a “spe-
cialized agency of the United Nations” that was established by the Chicago 
Convention in 1944 to ensure the safety and development of international 
civil aviation. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 
43–44, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. The 
members of the ICAO meet at least once every three years at the ICAO As-
sembly to set “legally binding standards,” “issue non-binding policy recom-
mendations,” and establish other policy for the organization. See Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Ener-
gy & Climate Change, Case C-366/10, (2011) ¶ 11 (delivered Oct. 6, 2011) (not 
yet reported) [hereinafter Opinion of Advocate General Kokott]; ICAO, Stand-
ing Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization, § 1, ICAO Doc. 7600/7 (7th ed. 2012). 
 10. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 112–14. 
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The Directive brings to the forefront the importance of the in-
clusion of aviation emissions in an international framework to 
address climate change and reflects the EU’s prominent role in 
pushing global climate change negotiations forward.11 
Dissension to the Directive centers on the debate over the de-
gree to which a country can unilaterally impose environmental 
policies with extraterritorial effects.12 Several major economic 
powers, such as the United States, India, and China, have 
made their opposition to the Directive known through domestic 
legislation, escalating the conflict. China provisionally barred 
airlines from complying with the Directive, and suspended a 
US$14 billion deal with a European commercial aircraft manu-
facturer.13 Similarly, India directed domestic commercial air-
craft carriers not to comply with the Directive.14 In November 
2012, President Barack Obama signed the “European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act,” prohibiting U.S. 
aircraft operators from participating in the EU ETS.15 That 
same month, following a meeting of the ICAO Council, the EU 
agreed to temporarily “stop the clock” on the enforcement of the 
Directive, conditioned on the realization of a global market-
based measure for aviation emissions at the 38th ICAO As-
sembly in 2013.16 
                                                                                                             
 11. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 4–6. 
 12. CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW (CISDL), 
LEGAL ANALYSIS ON THE INCLUSION OF CIVIL AVIATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM 8 (Verki Michael Tunteng ed., 2012) [hereinafter 
CISDL]. 
 13. Anurag Kotoky, India Joins China in Boycott of EU Carbon Scheme, 
REUTERS (Mar. 22, 2012), 
www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USLNE82L02220120322; see J.A., China 
and Europe’s Emission-Trading Scheme Not Free to Fly, ECONOMIST (Feb. 8, 
2012), www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/02/china-and-europes-
emission-trading-scheme. 
 14. Kotoky, supra note 13. 
 15. European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, 
Pub. L. No. 112-200, 126 Stat. 1477 (2012); 
Brian Beary, Obama Signs Anti-EU Emissions Trading Bill, EUROPOLITICS 
(Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.europolitics.info/sectoral-policies/obama-signs-
anti-eu-emissions-trading-bill-art345643-15.html. 
 16. Commission Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of 
the Council derogating temporarily from Directive 2003/87/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading within the Community, at 4–5, COM (2012) 697 
(Nov. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Commission Proposal on Derogation from EU 
ETS]; Memorandum from the European Commission, Stopping the clock of 
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If the EU reinstates the Directive following the 38th ICAO 
Assembly, countries are likely to challenge the consistency of 
the Directive with World Trade Organization (“WTO”) rules 
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.17 Since aviation in-
volves trade in cargo, the aggrieved parties would likely allege 
that the Directive serves as an impediment to trade, in conflict 
with the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (“GATT”), a 
WTO agreement governing international trade in goods.18 This 
conflict is reminiscent of the environmental dispute in U.S.–
Shrimp,19 where the Appellate Body held that unilateral envi-
ronmental measures may be justified by the social and envi-
ronmental exceptions contained within GATT Article XX. 20 
                                                                                                             
ETS and aviation emissions following last week’s International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) Council, MEMO/12/854 (Nov. 12, 2012), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-854_en.htm. 
 17. NIGEL PURVIS & SAMUEL GRAUSZ, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE 
UNITED STATES, AIR SUPREMACY – THE SURPRISINGLY IMPORTANT DOGFIGHT 
OVER CLIMATE POLLUTION FROM INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 3 (2012). The WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body was formed to resolve disputes between WTO 
Members “concerning their rights and obligations” under the WTO agree-
ments. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. If mem-
bers cannot reach mutual agreement on the dispute, the complaining party 
can request the establishment of a panel to examine the matter and make 
recommendations, which are subject to appellate review by the WTO’s Appel-
late Body. Id. art. 1–19. 
 18. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, pmbl., art. III, ¶ 1 
(Marrakesh, Morocco, 15 April 1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 190, 33 I.L.M. 1153 
(1994) [hereinafter GATT]. 
 19. The report of a panel or the Appellate Body pertaining to a specific 
dispute is only applicable to the parties to that dispute, and even if adopted 
does not have binding precedential value. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Legal 
effect of panel and appellate body reports and DSB recommendations and rul-
ings: 7.2 Legal status of adopted/unadopted reports in other disputes, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c7s2p1_e.
htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). However, the reasoning developed in these 
reports pertaining to the interpretation of WTO rules may be persuasive in 
subsequent cases. Id. 
 20. Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp Products, ¶ 147, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). While the preamble 
to the WTO agreement explicitly recognizes the need to “protect and preserve 
the environment,” environmentalists have historically found international 
trade rules to be a major obstacle to the implementation of environmental 
policies, even coining the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(“GATT”) as “GATTzilla,” and characterizing the WTO as an organization 
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However, the Directive does not fall within the protection of 
Article XX because the re-routing of flights to evade full com-
pliance with the measure, and the pass-through of compliance 
costs into the price of goods, will result in a net increase in 
GHG emissions.21 This will serve to undermine the relationship 
between the EU’s rationale for the trade-restrictive effects of 
the measure and its legitimate objective of GHG emission re-
ductions.22 Failure of the Directive before the WTO will under-
cut the important role the EU plays as a driving force behind 
climate change negotiations, with disastrous consequences for 
the achievement of a global market-based measure for aviation 
emissions, and a global climate regime as a whole.23 
This Note argues that in light of these risks—the debilitation 
of the EU’s critical role as a climate leader and the jeopardiza-
tion of a global climate regime, generally—the EU should fore-
stall the extra-territorial application of the Directive, even if 
the 38th ICAO Assembly fails to make sufficient progress on a 
market-based measure, so as to allow for a multi-lateral 
agreement to be reached in the ICAO or another forum.24 Part I 
provides background on the Directive and how it may be chal-
lenged under WTO rules. Part II examines how the Directive is 
not justified under the exceptions of GATT Article XX, in light 
of the reasoning in the U.S.–Shrimp decision. Part III discusses 
                                                                                                             
that prioritizes trade liberalization at the cost of the environment. Id. pmbl.; 
Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Dis-
guised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
739, 752 (2001). Alternatively, opponents to such environmental measures 
argue that concessions for environmental policies will be used as a façade for 
“increased trade protectionism of domestic industry,” and trigger “tit-for-tat 
trade restrictions.” Meltzer, supra note 7, at 117; GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., 
GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 13 (2009). Hufbauer pro-
vides a hypothetical example of tit-for-tat trade restrictions: the United 
States could enact performance standards or carbon taxes for certain imports 
from a country such as India, arguing that Indian industries have high GHG 
emissions. HUFBAUER ET AL., at 13. In response, India could “impose a duty 
on all imports from the United States,” arguing that the United States’ aver-
age CO2 emissions are greater than the world average. Id. 
 21. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 140–45. 
 22. See Appellate Body, Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded 
Tyres, ¶ 227, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007). 
 23. See Louise Van Schaik & Simon Schunz, Explaining EU Activism and 
Impact in Global Climate Politics: Is the Union a Norm- or Interest-Driven 
Actor? 50 J. COMMON MKT. STUDIES 169, 179–82 (2012); PURVIS & GRAUSZ, 
supra note 17, at 3. 
 24. See Schaik & Schunz, supra note 23, at 183–84. 
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the implications of this outcome for future efforts to combat 
climate change and recommends that the EU continue to defer 
the extraterritorial enforcement of its Directive until a multi-
lateral environmental agreement is reached for aviation emis-
sions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Expansion of the EU ETS 
The EU emerged as a driving force for international climate 
policy during the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“Convention” or “UNFCCC”).25 Under the Convention, the EU 
committed to reduce its emissions by 8% of 1990 levels by 
2012,26 a commitment it voluntarily revised in 2007 to 20% of 
1990 levels by 2020.27 To assist in achieving its Kyoto commit-
ments, and to contribute to the international goal of limiting 
global temperature increases to 2° Celsius, the EU implement-
ed its cap-and-trade scheme, the EU ETS.28 The EU ETS seeks 
to reduce GHG emissions by capping the total volume of emis-
sions from businesses in the energy-intensive industry and 
power sectors at a certain level. 29 These large emitters are 
then required to obtain “allowances” to cover each ton of CO2 or 
CO2-equivalent they release within the capped emissions 
amount.30 
                                                                                                             
 25. The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), that sets 
binding targets for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Kyoto Protocol to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 2.2, Dec. 
10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter 
Kyoto Protocol]. 
 26. Jos Delbeke, The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS): The Cornerstone of 
the EU’s Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, 1 EUR. REV. OF ENERGY MKT. 
1, 2 (2006); Sebastian Oberthür & Claire Roche Kelly, EU Leadership in In-
ternational Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges, 43 THE INT’L 
SPECTATOR 35, 36 (2008). 
 27. Delbeke, supra note 26, at 2; Oberthür & Kelly, supra note 26, at 36. 
 28. Council Directive 2003/87/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) art. 1, 5 (EU); Council 
Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 3–5, 10–11. 
 29. Delbeke, supra note 26, at 2; Council Directive 2003/87/EC, supra note 
28, at Annex 1; European Commission Report on The EU Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS), supra note 1. 
 30. European Commission Report on The EU Emissions Trading System 
(EU ETS), supra note 1. 
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Businesses can acquire allowances in several ways. First, the 
government allocates a set number of free allowances, the pro-
portion of which decreases the longer the EU ETS is in opera-
tion.31  The remaining allowances are then auctioned, where 
companies may buy additional allowances if needed to fully 
cover their emissions or sell their surplus allowances.32 The EU 
ETS requires companies to monitor and report their annual 
GHG emissions to an accredited independent verifier.33 A com-
pany is sanctioned if its emissions exceed the number of allow-
ances it holds.34 The EU reports that the EU ETS currently co-
vers 45% of the total GHG emissions from the EU member 
countries.35 
In accordance with the system established under the EU 
ETS, the Directive sets a cap on the permissible amount of avi-
ation emissions. Airlines are then responsible for covering their 
annual emissions with tradable allowances.36 The allocation of 
allowances is divided into trading periods.37 During the 2012 
trading period, emissions were capped at “97% of historical 
aviation emissions.” 38 During the 2013 trading period,39 and in 
subsequent trading periods subject to revision, emissions are 
                                                                                                             
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art. 3(c). 
 37. Id. art. 3. National governments appoint companies to facilitate the 
auction process, either opting to use a common platform or establishing their 
own platforms for the auctioning of allowances, as Germany, Poland, and the 
United Kingdom have done. European Commission Report on The EU Emis-
sions Trading System (EU ETS), supra note 1. 
 38. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art. 3(c). “Historical avia-
tion emissions” are defined as “the mean average of the annual emissions in 
the calendar years 2004, 2005, and 2006 from aircraft performing an aviation 
activity listed in Annex I.” Id. art. 1.3(s). The Directive defines “aircraft oper-
ator” as, “the person who operates an aircraft at the time it performs an avia-
tion activity listed in Annex I or, where that person is not known or is not 
identified by the owner of the aircraft, the owner of the aircraft.” Id. art. 1, 
3(b). Emissions are calculated by multiplying the fuel consumption of the 
flight by an emission factor that is taken from the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (“IPCC”) guidelines. Id., Annex IV(b). 
 39. While the EU temporarily deferred enforcement of the Directive to 
non-EU aircraft operators, as of November 2012, pending the 38th ICAO As-
sembly, the Directive still applies to intra-EU flights. Commission Proposal 
on Derogation from EU ETS, supra note 16, at 4–5. 
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capped at 95% of historical aviation emissions.40 While 15% of 
allowances are distributed through the auction process, the 
remaining allowances are granted to aircraft operators free of 
charge.41 Aircraft operators that do not comply with the Di-
rective are subject to a penalty of roughly €100 per missing al-
lowance, and are still responsible for coming up with the miss-
ing allowances.42 If aircraft operators refuse to comply, they 
may be subject to a ban from operating in the EU.43 
There are three notable provisions of the Directive. First, to 
address “carbon leakage” and competitiveness concerns, the EU 
included non-EU airlines within the Directive and required air-
lines to obtain allowances for the full-length of flights landing 
in or taking off from the EU, including the portion of the flight 
outside of EU territory.44 Carbon leakage occurs when busi-
nesses transfer production to countries with more lax environ-
mental policies to evade the costs of complying with an envi-
ronmental regulation,45 thereby diluting the effectiveness of the 
measure’s objective to reduce carbon emissions.46 Competitive-
ness concerns arise when price increases as a result of in-
creased environmental regulation lead foreign countries to sub-
stitute domestic goods for imported goods from the EU.47 In ad-
dition, if the Directive only applied to the part of the flight 
within the EU, an aircraft operator may adjust his or her flight 
plan to minimize the distance flown within the EU and evade 
compliance with the Directive.48 This would result in an overall 
increase in the length of the flight and the related GHG emis-
sions. 49  If unaddressed, carbon leakage and competitiveness 
                                                                                                             
 40. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art. 3. 
 41. Id. art. 3(d)(3). 
 42. ICAO, Inclusion of International Civil Aviation in the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and its Impact, at 1.3, ICAO Doc. C-
WP/13790 (Oct. 17, 2011); Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art. 
16. 
 43. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 26. 
 44. E.g., Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art. 3; Meltzer, su-
pra note 7, at 116–22. 
 45. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 16. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 116–22. 
 48. Id. at 140. 
 49. Id. at 145. 
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issues would lead to a lack of net emissions reductions and 
serve as a major disadvantage to domestic industry.50 
Second, the Directive contains several exemptions under 
which certain flights may be excluded from the regulatory 
scheme.51 First, the Directive contains a conditional exemption 
to allow for the optimal interaction between the Directive and 
measures adopted in non-EU countries to address aviation 
emissions.52 The conditional exemption provides for coordina-
tion between the two regulatory schemes, or exemption of the 
non-EU country’s aviation emissions from the Directive.53 Sec-
ond, the EU commits to mitigate or eliminate obstacles to ac-
cessibility or competitiveness issues that may arise under the 
Directive.54 This commitment seeks to take into account coun-
tries that may be disproportionately disadvantaged by the op-
eration of the Directive, such as countries dependent on tour-
ism.55 Other activities excluded from the requirements of the 
Directive include aircraft operators that fly a de minimus 
number of flights per allowance period and flights relating to 
military operations, scientific research, public service, training, 
and the official duties of government officials.56 
Third, to further contribute to the EU ETS’s objective to com-
bat global climate change, the Directive pledges to allocate all 
revenues from the auctioning of allowances to climate change 
research, adaptation, and mitigation efforts in the EU and in 
other countries.57 In addition, the EU expresses its intention 
for the Directive to serve as a blueprint for emissions trading 
schemes in other countries, which will ultimately link with the 
EU ETS and serve as a stepping stone towards an internation-
al framework addressing aviation-related climate change activ-
ities.58 
                                                                                                             
 50. See Id. at 111–12, 116–18. 
 51. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art. 25. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. art. 30. 
 55. See id. art. 30. An example of a country dependent on tourism is Bar-
bados, where tourism accounts for 59% of the country’s GDP. Lorand Bartels, 
The WTO Legality of the Application of the EU’s Emission Trading System to 
Aviation, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 429, 433 n.31 (2012). 
 56. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, Annex 1(b)–(c). 
 57. Id. at 22. 
 58. Id. at 5–6, 17. 
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While the EU frames the Directive as a building block for an 
international emissions trading scheme for aviation, its deci-
sion to regulate aviation emissions was made independent of 
any international decision making body. Historically, interna-
tional discussions on the regulation of aviation emissions have 
been unfruitful. When the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol 
failed to reach an agreement on how to address aviation emis-
sions, future efforts to make GHG emissions reductions in this 
area were relegated to the ICAO.59 The ICAO lists environmen-
tal protection as one of its strategic objectives, but by 2004 it 
had made few developments on how to address aviation emis-
sions and it appeared that an emissions trading system for avi-
ation would not be pursued under the ICAO’s auspices.60 Dis-
satisfied with the slow progress of international negotiations, 
in 2008 the EU enacted the Directive.61 
The ICAO expressed strong opposition to the Directive in a 
working paper that was supported by “26 of the 36 Member 
States on the ICAO Council.”62 The ICAO denounced the EU’s 
unilateral market-based system, holding the view that the Di-
rective undermines the ICAO’s leadership in the field of inter-
national aviation and its ability to serve as a forum for effec-
tively addressing aviation’s contribution to global climate 
                                                                                                             
 59. Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol states, “The Parties included in Annex 
I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, 
working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the In-
ternational Maritime Organization respectively.” Kyoto Protocol, supra note 
25, art. 2.2. 
 60. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 9. In 2007, the ICAO 
established a special group to create a climate change program within the 
ICAO and has since endorsed the development of a market-based mechanism 
for aviation emissions if achieved through mutual agreement between mem-
ber states. ICAO, Assembly Resolution in Force (as of 28 September 2007), 
app. K–L, ICAO Assembly Resolution A36-22 (2008); ICAO, Consolidated 
statement of continuing ICAO policies and practices related to environmental 
protection – climate change, ¶¶ 13–18, ICAO Assemb. Res. A37-19 (2010), 
compiled in Resolutions Adopted by the Assembly, at 55–63 (Provisional ed., 
Nov. 2010) [hereinafter ICAO Assemb. Res. A37-19]. The ICAO has yet to 
produce binding commitments to aviation emission reductions. Kate Kulove-
si, “Make your own special song, even if nobody else sings along”: Internation-
al aviation emissions and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, 2 CLIMATE L. 
535, 541 (2011). 
 61. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 9. 
 62. CISDL, supra note 12, at 15. 
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change.63 The ICAO asserted that the Directive is not an effec-
tive tool to address aviation’s contribution to climate change, 
because it will instigate nations to develop competing market-
based schemes, creating a “chaotic” system with adverse effects 
on efforts to reduce global emissions.64 In addition, the ICAO 
expressed its concern that the EU’s unilateral measure will not 
adequately consider the different conditions that exist in dif-
ferent countries, especially in developing nations.65 Indeed, the 
airline industry’s opposition to the Directive became even more 
apparent when U.S. airline carriers challenged the validity of 
the Directive before the European Court of Justice, a decision 
that addressed the ICAO’s role in regulating aviation emis-
sions.66 
B. Legal Challenges to the Directive 
The international aviation community initiated the first legal 
challenge to the Directive in the European Court of Justice.67 
Airline industry leaders challenged the validity of the Di-
rective, with a claim largely focused on the Directive’s inclusion 
of transatlantic aviation.68 The case looked at the relationship 
between EU law and international law, and the extent to which 
                                                                                                             
 63. Inclusion of International Civil Aviation in the EU ETS and its Impact, 
supra note 42, at 4.2. 
 64. Id. at 3.2, 4.2. 
 65. Id. at 3.1. 
 66. CISDL, supra note 12, at 3. 
 67. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy & Climate 
Change, Case C-366/10, (2011), ¶¶ 1–2 (delivered Dec. 21, 2011) [hereinafter 
ATAA]. The Directive was challenged under the customary international law 
principles of State sovereignty and freedom to fly over the high seas, as well 
as the Chicago Convention, Open Skies Agreement, and Kyoto Protocol. 
ATAA, ¶ 158. 
 68. Id. ¶¶ 42–45. The claimants included the Air Transport Association of 
America (“ATAA”), a non-profit “trade and service organization,” and Ameri-
can Airlines, Continental Airlines, and United Airlines. Id. ¶¶ 2, 42. The In-
ternational Air Transport Association and the National Airlines Council of 
Canada intervened on the side of the claimants, while five environmental 
organizations intervened on the side of the Defendant, including the Aviation 
Environment Federation, the British World Wildlife Fund for Nature, the 
European Federation for Transport and Environment, the Environmental 
Defense Fund, and Earthjustice. Id. ¶ 44. 
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the EU can unilaterally regulate aviation emissions in the ab-
sence of an international regulatory framework.69 
The court found that the Directive is not a mandatory provi-
sion on conduct of non-EU countries over international territo-
ry, but that it merely takes into account extraterritorial activi-
ties that have a substantial effect on the EU’s environmental 
interests.70 Focusing on the environmental protection objectives 
of the Directive, the court found that commercial operators 
must comply with EU law when they land or depart from an 
aerodrome within the territory of the EU.71 The court’s inter-
pretation thus characterizes the Directive as an internal rule 
that has effects outside the EU, and not as a unilateral ac-
tion.72 
                                                                                                             
 69. Sanja Bogojević, Legalising Environmental Leadership: A Comment on 
the CJEU’S Ruling in C-366/10 on the Inclusion of Aviation in the EU Emis-
sions Trading Scheme, 24 J. ENVTL. L. 345, 347 (2012). The Chicago Conven-
tion was not considered binding on the EU, since the EU is not a contracting 
party to the agreement. ATAA, supra note 67, ¶¶ 57–71. The Kyoto Protocol 
was also not considered a basis for natural persons to challenge the validity 
of the Directive since it governs relations between states, and not individuals. 
Id. ¶¶ 73–77. The court then considered the Open Skies Agreement. While 
the court found that the airlines could rely on certain provisions of the Open 
Skies Agreement to challenge the validity of the Directive, it found that the 
Open Skies Agreement does not preclude application of the Directive to 
flights that arrive or depart from aerodromes within the territory of the EU 
when such a measure is uniformly applied to EU airlines. Id. ¶¶ 79–100, 
131–57. Finally, the court considered customary international law, and held 
that although individuals can challenge an act of the European Union utiliz-
ing principles of customary international law, the court’s review is limited to 
a standard that requires the European Union to have committed manifest 
error in adopting the challenged act. Id. ¶¶ 101–11, 130. The court did not 
find manifest error in the EU’s adoption of the Directive in light of the cus-
tomary international law principles that (1) “each State has complete and 
exclusive sovereignty over its airspace,” (2) “that no State may validly pur-
port to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty,” and (3) the “guar-
antee[] [of] freedom to fly over the high seas.” Id. ¶¶ 111, 114–30. 
 70. See ATAA, supra note 67, ¶¶ 125–30. It is not uncommon for a State to 
exercise its sovereignty extraterritorially; for example, anti-trust laws con-
sider agreements outside the territorial jurisdiction of the regulating country. 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 9, ¶¶ 145–49. 
 71. Bogojević, supra note 69, at 350–51. 
 72. Id. at 350–52. This is supported by the EU’s commitment in the Di-
rective to continue to work towards a multilateral agreement and by the EU’s 
intention to have the Directive complement similar programs developed in 
other countries, as noted above in Part I.A. Bogojević, supra note 69, at 348; 
Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 5, 17, art. 25. 
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The claimants’ second contention was that the application of 
a cap and trade scheme to aviation emissions should be negoti-
ated and agreed upon within the ICAO, and not implemented 
through the unilateral action of one party.73 Their argument 
was based on Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol, which expresses 
a preference for the ICAO to determine an appropriate ap-
proach to reducing aviation emissions.74 However, the Europe-
an Court of Justice found that individuals cannot rely on the 
Kyoto Protocol to challenge the validity of a measure of the Eu-
ropean Parliament.75 Third, the complainants argued that the 
Directive constitutes a “tax or charge on fuel” that is impermis-
sible under the Open Skies Agreement.76 The court rejected 
this argument,77 and instead found that the emissions allow-
ances are market-based measures.78 
In upholding the validity of the Directive, the European 
Court of Justice authorized the EU’s discretion to take unilat-
eral environmental measures.79 The court’s decision marks the 
transition of international climate change governance into the 
“judicial realm,” a transition from global negotiations to re-
                                                                                                             
 73. See generally ATAA, supra note 67; Opinion of Advocate General Ko-
kott, supra note 9, ¶ 42. 
 74. ATAA, supra note 67, ¶¶ 45, 77; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 
supra note 9, ¶ 183; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 2.2. In her advisory 
opinion, Advocate General Kokott argued that even if Article 2.2 expresses a 
preference that a market-based measure for aviation be developed in the 
ICAO, this does not bar the EU from implementing an independent program. 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 9, ¶ 186. In addition, Advo-
cate General Kokott pointed out that while the ICAO 36th Assembly made a 
statement against unilateral action on aviation emissions, this was only a 
non-binding political declaration and the EU Member States that are parties 
to the ICAO reserved the right to use market-based measures. Id. ¶ 191. 
 75. ATAA, supra note 67, ¶ 77. 
 76. Id. ¶¶ 136–47; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 9, at ¶¶ 
35–36. 
 77. ATAA, supra note 67, ¶¶ 136–47. In addition, the court found the Di-
rective is not a “customs duty, tax, fee or charge on fuel” because there is no 
direct link between the quantity of fuel consumed and the cost of allowance, 
the cost of allowance determined by market price upon initial allocation. Id. ¶ 
142. 
 78. The EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme is a market-based measure in 
that it is based on supply and demand of emissions allowances. Bogojević, 
supra note 69, at 355. This is dissimilar from a tax that is “fixed in advance.” 
Id. 
 79. See generally ATAA, supra note 67. 
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gional judicial disputes.80 The aviation community, dissatisfied 
with the ruling of the European Court of Justice, has threat-
ened further legal action within the ICAO and the WTO.81 
While the extra-territorial application of the Directive is sus-
pended pending the outcome of the ICAO 38th Assembly, the 
EU clearly expressed its intention to reinstate the Directive if 
insufficient progress is made.82 In the event that the extraterri-
torial application of the Directive is reinstated in the absence of 
an international agreement, it is likely that an action would be 
initiated within the ICAO’s dispute-resolution process, the re-
sult of which would be appealed to the WTO.83 
C. Potential Challenges Under WTO Rules 
The WTO was established in 1995 to facilitate trade between 
WTO Member nations.84 The WTO is a rule-based organization 
run by negotiated agreements, such as the GATT.85 Through 
these agreements, the WTO seeks to foster “mutually advanta-
geous arrangements” that reduce trade barriers and eliminate 
discrimination in trade relations.86 These principles serve to 
“protect the value of trade concessions,” promote “free and fair 
competition,” and protect against “corruption of the multilat-
eral trading system” caused by the unequal treatment of trad-
ing partners.87 
The WTO administers the rules and procedures of covered 
agreements and settles trade disputes through its Dispute Set-
tlement Body. 88  In the event of a conflict between member 
                                                                                                             
 80. Bogojević, supra note 69, at 356. 
 81. Joint Declaration of the Moscow Meeting on Inclusion of Civil Aviation 
in the EU ETS, Russian Aviation (Feb. 22, 2012) 
http://www.ruaviation.com/docs/1/2012/2/22/50/ [hereinafter Meeting on In-
clusion of Civil Aviation in the EU ETS]. 
 82. Commission Proposal on Derogation from EU ETS, supra note 16, at 
4–5. 
 83. See Chicago Convention, supra note 9, art. 84; PURVIS & GRAUSZ, supra 
note 17, at 6. 
 84. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
 85. GATT, supra note 18. In addition to the GATT, the WTO has agree-
ments that govern trade in services, intellectual property, and the settlement 
of disputes. Id. 
 86. WTO Agreement, supra note 84. 
 87. DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 145 (2008). 
 88. DSU, supra note 17, art. 1–19. 
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states, an aggrieved party first engages in consultations with 
the country it alleges acted in contravention of a WTO agree-
ment.89 If the countries fail to settle the dispute independently, 
the aggrieved party may then request that the WTO establish a 
panel to make a ruling on the issue, the decision of which can 
be appealed to the Appellate Body.90 If the panel or Appellate 
Body determine that a country’s specific trade measure does 
not conform to the WTO, the country must bring the measure 
into compliance.91 If the offending party fails to do so within a 
reasonable period, it will be subject to sanctions and the ag-
grieved party may be permitted to impose retaliatory 
measures.92 
While the Dispute Settlement Body cannot coerce nations to 
comply with its decisions, the system works through “peer 
pressure and the collective desire of all WTO Members to pre-
serve the [multilateral trading] system.” 93  In this way, the 
WTO is revealed to be an organization in which the principle 
actors are national governments seeking to maintain the bal-
ance between a liberal trading system and domestic autono-
my.94 The WTO and the Dispute Settlement Body must there-
fore be sensitive to states’ interests in order to “maximize the 
political support for [its] decisions” and thereby maintain sup-
port for the WTO and its trade liberalization objectives.95 
If the application of the Directive to non-EU airlines is rein-
stated after the 38th ICAO Assembly, an aggrieved nation can 
request that the Dispute Settlement Body convene a panel. 
Since it is estimated that the Directive will cost airlines up to 
US$4.3 billion by 2015, airlines may deal with these costs by 
passing them onto consumers in the price of tickets for flights, 
                                                                                                             
 89. Id. art. 4. 
 90. Id. art. 5–6. 
 91. Id. Annex 2. 
 92. Id. art. 22. 
 93. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 87, at 52. 
 94. John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and 
the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 47 (2004). 
 95. Id. While trade liberalization leads to productivity and welfare gains—
for example, globalization has added between $800 billion to $1.5 trillion to 
the U.S. economy—it is often accompanied by concerns that domestic indus-
try will be harmed by increased foreign competition. HOUSER ET. AL., 
PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS & WORLD RESOURCES 
INSTITUTE, LEVELING THE CARBON PLAYING FIELD: INTERNATIONAL 
COMPETITION AND U.S. CLIMATE POLICY DESIGN 4 (2008). 
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and in the price of goods transported by air.96 Due to the Di-
rective’s effect on trade in goods, it is likely that the aggrieved 
nation or nations will cite to the GATT in their complaint.97 
The pass through of the costs of compliance with the Directive, 
and the greater compliance costs for foreign airlines that fly 
greater distances than domestic airlines, will lead to a violation 
of the principle of non-discrimination, incorporated in the 
GATT through GATT Article I Most-Favored Nation (“MFN”) 
Treatment, and GATT Article III National Treatment. 
MFN requires that any trade advantage a member gives to a 
product originating in another country must be “immediately 
and unconditionally” given to “like products98 originating” in 
the other WTO Member states. 99 The MFN clause is triggered 
by the Directive’s conditional exemption for countries that 
adopt their own climate reduction strategies for aviation.100 If 
countries pass the cost of complying with the Directive into the 
price of cargo, two countries that import a like product—one 
that has received the exemption and one that has not—would 
pay different cargo rates.101 For example, consider a situation 
where Country A and Country B both import a like product in-
to the EU.102 If the EU were to then exempt Country A from 
the Directive, Country A would face lower cargo rates for its 
product than Country B.103 This would result in differential 
treatment between the two countries, and call the consistency 
                                                                                                             
 96. If airlines pass the cost of compliance into the cost of tickets on com-
mercial flights, this could result in an increase cost per passenger from $2.60 
to $6.00. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 121. 
 97. Id. at 127. While the decision to pass compliance costs into the price of 
goods will be made by private companies, the EU is not relieved of its obliga-
tions under the GATT because the requirements of the Directive are what 
necessitate this private choice. See Appellate Body Report, Korea–Measures 
Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 146, WT/DS161/AB/R, 
WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000); see Meltzer, supra note 7, at 133. 
 98. Whether two products are considered “like” depends upon the similari-
ties between the products’ end-uses, consumers’ tastes and preferences, phys-
ical characteristics, and tariff classifications. Appellate Body Report, Japan–
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 20–23, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996). 
 99. GATT, supra note 18, art. I, ¶ 1. 
 100. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 137. 
 101. Id. at 137–38. 
 102. See id. at 138. 
 103. Id. 
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of the Directive with the MFN principle of unconditionality into 
question.104 
The principle of non-discrimination is also found in GATT Ar-
ticle III, “National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regu-
lation.”105 The National Treatment provision requires that for-
eign goods be treated no less favorably than domestic goods, 
extending the principle of non-discrimination to the treatment 
of foreign goods once they enter the domestic market.106 GATT 
Article III:2 states that products imported by a contracting par-
ty “shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes 
or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, 
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.”107 If the pur-
chase of emissions allowances is considered an indirect tax or 
charge, then imported products may be considered taxed “in 
excess” of like domestic products, constituting de facto discrim-
ination as a result of the greater distance the products are 
transported.108 In addition, GATT Article III:1 prohibits inter-
nal taxes, charges, laws and regulations, applied “so as to af-
ford protection to domestic production.”109 The Directive explic-
itly references competitiveness concerns alongside its environ-
mental objectives in enacting the measure.110 If a panel finds 
the primary purpose of the Directive is to protect domestic air-
lines from competition, the Directive would be found in viola-
tion of Article III:1.111 
                                                                                                             
 104. Id. at 137–38. 
 105. GATT, supra note 18, art. III, ¶ 2. 
 106. Id. art. III. National Treatment encompasses internal taxes and charg-
es, including those imposed at the border, and internal regulations that gov-
ern the “conditions of sale and purchase,” including regulations that adverse-
ly effect the conditions of competition between the domestic and imported 
goods. See, Id. art. III; Report of the Panel, Italian Discrimination Against 
Imported Agricultural Machinery, ¶ 12, L/833 (Jul. 15, 1958); GATT B.I.S.D. 
(7th Supp.) at 60 (1958). 
 107. GATT, supra note 18, art. III, ¶ 2. 
 108. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 133–34. The European Court of Justice’s de-
termination that the emissions allowances were not a tax or charge in Air 
Transp. Ass’n of Am. does not dictate whether the Directive will be found to 
be a tax or a charge under GATT Article III:2, since the European Court of 
Justice’s interpretation was made under a different agreement. Opinion of 
Advocate General Kokott, supra note 9, ¶¶ 35–38; Meltzer, supra note 7, at 
130. 
 109. GATT, supra note 18, art. III, ¶ 1. 
 110. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 16. 
 111. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 135. 
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The Directive is also inconsistent with GATT Article III:4.112 
GATT Article III:4 requires that “the products of the territory 
of any contracting party imported into the territory of any oth-
er contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less fa-
vourable than that accorded to like products of national 
origin.”113 The purchase of a greater number of GHG emission 
allowances because of greater distances flown involves a cost 
on imported goods that is not imposed on like domestic goods, 
and therefore constitutes less favorable treatment in violation 
of Article III:4.114 However, the Directive’s violation of GATT 
Articles I and III is not dispositive of its conformity with its 
WTO obligations. As a measure intended to address global cli-
mate change that is “otherwise inconsistent with GATT,” the 
environmental objectives of the measure may entitle it to justi-
fication under the General Exceptions of GATT Article XX for 
social and environmental measures.115 
II. GATT ARTICLE XX AND THE AVIATION DIRECTIVE 
A. The General Exceptions of GATT Article XX 
The determination of whether a trade restrictive measure is 
justified under GATT Article XX requires a two-tiered analy-
sis.116 First, a panel will examine whether the measure falls 
within one of the ten categories of social and environmental 
exceptions of Article XX.117 Second, if the measure is found to 
fall within one of the exceptions, it must also satisfy the re-
quirements of the introductory clause to Article XX, the cha-
peau.118 A measure violates the chapeau to Article XX if the 
application of the measure results in discrimination that is 
“arbitrary or unjustifiable,” and “between countries where the 
                                                                                                             
 112. Id. 
 113. GATT, supra note 18, art. III, ¶ 4. 
 114. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 136. 
 115. Knox, supra note 94, at 9; GATT, supra note 18, art. XX. 
 116. Appellate Body Report, United States–Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, 22–23, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. The chapeau to Article XX is a principle of “good faith” that at-
tempts to prevent the “nullification or impairment” of the rights of other 
members by the improper use of the Article XX exceptions. United States–
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, supra note 20, ¶ 159. 
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same conditions prevail,” or where the measure constitutes a 
“disguised restriction on trade.”119 
The Directive falls within two of the GATT Article XX excep-
tions. The first is GATT Article XX(g), which exempts measures 
relating to the “conservation of exhaustible natural resources” 
that are “made effective in conjunction with restrictions on do-
mestic production or consumption.”120 The Appellate Body in 
U.S.–Shrimp, “open[ed] the door to unilateral environmental 
measures under Article XX(g),” when it found that the United 
States’ unilateral “import ban on shrimp harvested” in a way 
that endangers certain species of sea turtles fell within the Ar-
ticle XX(g) exception. 121  The Appellate Body’s interpretation 
allows countries to condition market access on compliance with 
unilateral environmental measures under GATT Article XX(g), 
yet it also marks the transition of the WTO’s disfavor of unilat-
eral measures into the chapeau.122 This reflects the WTO’s con-
cern that trade restrictive environmental policies will be used 
as a façade for trade protectionism.123 
Under GATT Article XX(g), for a measure to be considered 
“relating to” legitimate ends, the means must be narrowly fo-
cused and “reasonably related to [those] ends.”124 An “exhausti-
ble natural resource” is something that has value and that is 
capable of being depleted either quantitatively or qualitative-
                                                                                                             
 119. The term “discrimination” in the chapeau does not refer to the same 
“discrimination” referenced in the “substantive obligations of GATT 1994.” 
United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate 
Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 150. 
 120. GATT, supra note 18, art. XX(g). The Appellate Body’s decision in 
U.S.–Gasoline sheds light on what it considers when it examines a “measure” 
under GATT Article XX(g). The Appellate Body only found it necessary to 
review the particular provisions of the gasoline rule that were under review, 
and not the rule as a whole. United States–Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 13–14. 
This implies that if the extraterritorial application of the Directive is struck 
down before the WTO, the remaining provisions of the Directive can be pre-
served. 
 121. Gaines, supra note 20, at 749; United States–Import Prohibition of Cer-
tain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 138, 145. 
 122. Gaines, supra note 20, at 744. 
 123. See GATT, supra note 18, art. XX. 
 124. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appel-
late Body Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 138, 141. 
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ly.125 For example, in U.S.–Gasoline, the panel found that clean 
air was an exhaustible natural resource as it had value and 
was capable of being depleted through pollution, which had a 
negative impact on air quality. 126  “Exhaustible natural re-
sources” may be living or non-living, and do not necessarily 
have to be finite.127 The final requirement of Article XX(g) is 
implementation in conjunction with similar domestic measures 
to guarantee “even-handedness in the imposition of [the] re-
strictions” domestically and on imports.128 
The objective of the Directive is to stabilize GHG emissions 
from international air transport to mitigate the effects of cli-
mate change, including risk to ecosystems, to food production, 
and to human health and security.129 The reduction of atmos-
pheric concentrations of GHG emissions has a qualitative ef-
fect, in that it reduces secondary detrimental effects to the en-
vironment and human health. Therefore, the means of the Di-
                                                                                                             
 125. Panel Report, United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conven-
tional Gasoline, ¶ 6.37, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996). This panel’s finding that 
clean air is an exhaustible natural resource was not challenged in the appel-
late body report. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Convention-
al Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, supra note 116. Consideration of what 
constitutes an “exhaustible natural resource” is considered “in light of con-
temporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and 
conservation of the environment.” United States–Import Prohibition of Cer-
tain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20,  ¶ 129. 
 126. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
Panel Report, supra note 125, ¶ 6.37. 
 127. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appel-
late Body Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 128, 131. It is unclear whether there is a 
jurisdictional requirement to invoking the Article XX exception. However in 
U.S.–Shrimp, the migratory species of turtle protected by the U.S. measure 
was considered to have a sufficient jurisdictional nexus with the United 
States for regulation, even when some of the species regulated under the 
measure never entered U.S. jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 133. The EU’s Directive has a 
jurisdictional nexus with the EU as it seeks to protect the “atmosphere,” 
which is part of the global commons. Bartels, supra note 55, at 450. 
 128. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 20–21. U.S.–Gasoline interpreted 
this provision as “primarily aimed” at conservation goals. Id. The subsequent 
effects of the measure do not have to be immediate, as “a substantial period 
of time . . . may have to elapse before the effects attributable to implementa-
tion of a given measure may be observable.” Id. However, if a measure “can-
not in any possible situation have any positive effect on conservation goals,” 
the Appellate Body considered it likely that the measure was not primarily 
aimed at achieving the stated goals to begin with. Id. at 21–22. 
 129. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 2–3, 10, 14. 
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rective relate to its ends of climate change mitigation. The Di-
rective is “even-handed,” in that it applies equally to all flights 
that land or depart from an aerodrome in the EU, regardless of 
whether they are international or domestic flights.130 Thus, the 
Directive falls under the Article XX(g) exception. 
The Directive also falls under Article XX(b), exempting 
measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health.”131 For a measure to be necessary, the degree to which 
it materially contributes to reaching its objective is “weighed 
against its trade restrictiveness.”132 It does not have to be in-
dispensable, but there must be no reasonable alternative that 
is more consistent with the GATT.133 Furthermore, even if a 
measure’s contribution is not “immediately observable,” but 
spread out over time, it may still be justified under Article 
XX(b) when such projections are supported by quantitative or 
qualitative evidence. 134 
The Directive makes a material contribution to the reduction 
of GHG emissions in that it increases the price of allowances 
over time, providing an increasing economic incentive to mini-
mize and reduce emissions.135 In addition, revenue from the 
sale of allowances is donated to efforts to fight and adapt to 
climate change, which further contributes to its goals.136 It re-
mains to be seen whether opponents of the Directive will pro-
pose less trade restrictive alternatives that are more consistent 
with the GATT, and whether the Directive will prevail over 
these alternatives.137 
                                                                                                             
 130. Id. ¶ 16, art. 1. 
 131. GATT, supra note 18, art. XX(b). 
 132. Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body 
Report, supra note 22, ¶ 210. 
 133. Korea–Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh Chilled and Frozen Beef, 
Appellate Body Report, supra note 97, ¶ 161. While there may be no reasona-
ble alternative more consistent with the GATT, the country defending the 
measure does not have to identify and discount all potential alternatives. 
Bartels, supra note 55, at 451. 
 134. Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body 
Report, supra note 22, ¶ 151. The Appellate Body in Brazil–Tyres further 
stated that, “the result obtained from certain actions—for instance, measures 
adopted in order to attenuate global warming and climate change . . . may 
manifest themselves only after a certain period of time [and] can only be 
evaluated with the benefit of time.” Id. 
 135. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 143. 
 136. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 22. 
 137. Bartels, supra note 55, at 451. 
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Opponents of the Directive argue that if airlines pass the cost 
of complying with the Directive directly into cargo rates, there 
is no incentive for airlines to reduce overall emissions, weigh-
ing against a finding that the measure relates to its conserva-
tion goals under Article XX(g).138 However, a panel may inter-
pret this pass through as a transition of the Directive’s policy 
objectives into the price of goods—since the increase is still cor-
related to GHG emissions—thus maintaining the measure’s 
provisional justification under Article XX(g).139 While the Arti-
cle XX(b) “necessary” requirement is more stringent than the 
relationship of “relating to” in Article XX(g), both exceptions 
serve to justify the Directive. 
B. The Chapeau to Article XX 
Once the Directive is provisionally justified by one of the Ar-
ticle XX exceptions, the panel will examine the measure under 
the chapeau to Article XX. While U.S.–Shrimp established the 
permissibility of unilateral environmental measures under Ar-
ticle XX(g), the strict requirements of the chapeau remain a 
formidable obstacle and have been compared to the “eye of the 
needle” through which hardly any environmental measures 
will be able to pass.140 The chapeau to Article XX requires that 
application of these measures does not constitute: 
(a) “arbitrary discrimination” (between countries where the 
same conditions prevail); 
(b) “unjustifiable discrimination” with the same qualifier; or 
(c) “disguised restriction on international trade.”141 
Violation of any one of the three standards disqualifies the 
measure from justification under Article XX.142 The chapeau 
ensures that discriminatory measures that are considered “jus-
                                                                                                             
 138. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 141. 
 139. Id. at 144–45. 
 140. Gaines, supra note 20, at 741, 773. 
 141. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 23. 
 142. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appel-
late Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 184. Under the chapeau, the party invok-
ing the Article XX exceptions has the burden of showing that its measure is 
not applied so “as to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder of 
the right.” United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gas-
oline, Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 32. 
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tified” under the Article XX exceptions are based on a non-
protectionist rationale. 143 A court making a determination of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination will look at whether 
the cause or rationale for the discrimination bears a relation-
ship to the legitimate objective of the measure.144 
The first standard of the chapeau, arbitrary discrimination, 
looks at the procedures for implementing a measure, their flex-
ibility, and the degree to which they take into account “the ap-
propriateness of [the] programme for the conditions prevailing 
in the exporting country.” 145  In U.S.–Shrimp, the Appellate 
Body found the U.S.’s certification process denied certification 
to any country that did not impose the exact shrimp trawling 
methods unilaterally prescribed by the United States, regard-
less of the effectiveness of alternatives.146 The rote application 
of these standards lacked procedural fairness as certification 
decisions were made without a formal notification or review 
process.147 The Appellate Body found that the rigidity and in-
flexibility of the U.S. certification “could result in the negation 
of rights of Members,” and therefore constituted arbitrary dis-
crimination.148 
                                                                                                             
 143. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appel-
late Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 15; Gaines, supra note 20, at 739. The 
burden of proving that a measure “provisionally justified” under the Article 
XX exceptions does not constitute discrimination under the chapeau falls on 
the party invoking the exception. United States–Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 22–23. 
 144. Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body 
Report, supra note 22, ¶¶ 226–27. While the effects of the discrimination are 
also a relevant factor, they are not dispositive. For example, in Brazil–Tyres, 
the Appellate Body found that the panel used the incorrect analysis to inter-
pret the term “unjustifiable discrimination,” by focusing exclusively on the 
quantitative impact of the discrimination on achieving the environmental 
objective of the measure. Id. ¶¶ 229–30. 
 145. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 20, at 54; Panel Report, United States–
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Recourse to Arti-
cle 21.5 by Malaysia, ¶ 5.122, WT/DS58/RW (Jun. 15, 2001). 
 146. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appel-
late Body Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 177, 180. 
 147. The U.S. certification process provided no opportunity for member 
countries “to be heard, or to respond to any arguments made against it . . . 
before a decision to grant or to deny certification [was] made.” Id. ¶¶ 177, 
180–81. While a “list of approved applications [was] published in the Federal 
Register,” there was no opportunity to request review of, or appeal a decision 
of, denial. Id. 
 148. Id. ¶¶ 181, 184. 
1174 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:3 
The determination of unjustifiable discrimination looks at the 
substance of the application of the measure. 149  In U.S.–
Shrimp, the Appellate Body found that the United States’ im-
port ban constituted “unjustifiable discrimination” for several 
reasons. First, the Appellate Body found the application of the 
U.S. measure required countries to “adopt essentially the same 
regulatory program as the U.S.,” even if the members’ alterna-
tive programs served the United States’ declared policy goal.150 
This rigid and inflexible standard failed to take into account 
the different conditions within the member countries, consti-
tuting unjustifiable discrimination. 151  Second, the Appellate 
Body found unjustifiable discrimination in the United States’ 
failure to conduct across-the-board negotiations with member 
countries that exported shrimp with the purpose of reaching a 
multilateral or bilateral agreement prior to enforcing its ban.152 
Lastly, the Appellate Body noted the application of the United 
States’ measure was unilateral in character, heightening its 
“disruptive and discriminatory influence” and “underscoring its 
unjustifiability.”153 
Under the third standard of the chapeau to Article XX, a 
measure must not constitute a “disguised restriction on inter-
national trade.”154 Three standards are used to determine if a 
member is using the GATT Article XX exceptions to intention-
                                                                                                             
 149. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 20, at 54. 
 150. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appel-
late Body Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 164–65. 
 151. See Id. ¶¶ 161, 165–66, 172; HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 20, at 55. 
 152. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appel-
late Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 166. While there was no requirement for 
the conclusion of an agreement, the United States needed to make “serious, 
good faith efforts” to negotiate such an agreement to meet the requirements 
of the chapeau. Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Malaysia, ¶ 123, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001). In addition, the Appellate 
Body found it dispositive that the United States had not negotiated equally 
with all members affected by the ban and had not provided equal support in 
the form of transfer of TED technology to the countries involved. United 
States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Re-
port, supra note 20, ¶ 175. 
 153. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appel-
late Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 172. 
 154. GATT, supra note 18, art. XX. 
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ally “conceal the pursuit of trade-restrictive objectives.” 155 
First, the publicity test requires that the measure be publicly 
announced.156 Second, measures that constitute “arbitrary dis-
crimination” and “unjustifiable discrimination” have been in-
terpreted to lead to a determination that a measure is also a 
“disguised restriction on trade.”157 Third, the “design, architec-
ture and revealing structure”158 of the measure may reveal a 
protectionist objective.159 
The underlying purpose of the three standards in the cha-
peau is to avoid the abuse of the “exceptions to substantive 
rules” of the GATT provided in Article XX.160 The clause there-
by serves to balance a WTO Member’s legal right to invoke an 
Article XX exception, with the rights of other WTO Members.161 
This balancing mechanism has been described as a sliding 
scale that is evaluated on a case-by-case basis and that, when 
used to strike a balance between trade and environmental con-
cerns, has incorporated a preference for multilateralism.162 
C. Application of the Chapeau to Article XX to the Aviation Di-
rective 
The Appellate Body in U.S.–Shrimp recognized that unilat-
eral environmental measures that serve one of the legitimate 
                                                                                                             
 155. Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 8.236, WT/DS135/R (Sep. 18, 2000), quoted 
in Committee on Trade and Environment, GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement 
Practice Relating to GATT Article XX, Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g), ¶¶ 78–79, 
WT/CTE/W/203 (Mar. 8, 2002). 
 156. In EC–Asbestos, the panel considered the publication of the measure in 
an official journal of the member state to satisfy this requirement. European 
Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
Panel Report, supra note 155, ¶ 8.234. 
 157. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 25; GATT/WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Practice Relating to GATT Article XX, Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g), supra 
note 155, ¶ 82. 
 158. Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report, supra 
note 98, at 29. 
 159. European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, Panel Report, supra note 155, ¶ 8.236. 
 160. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 25. 
 161. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appel-
late Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 156. 
 162. Id. ¶ 159; Knox, supra note 94, at 56–57. 
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objectives in the GATT Article XX exceptions are not “a priori 
incapable of justification under Article XX.”163 The Appellate 
Body’s respect for the environmental policies of WTO Member 
countries was expressed in U.S.–Gasoline: “WTO Members 
have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own poli-
cies on the environment (including its relationship with trade), 
their environmental objectives, and the environmental legisla-
tion they enact and implement.”164 The Appellate Body found 
this interest to only be circumscribed by the substantive obliga-
tions of GATT and the other WTO agreements.165 However, 
while the Directive is provisionally justified under the Article 
XX exceptions of “conserving exhaustible natural resources,” 
and protecting “human, animal and plant life and health,” the 
application of the Directive constitutes arbitrary and unjustifi-
able discrimination under the chapeau. 
Two scenarios identify implicit “arbitrary and unjustifiable 
discrimination” in the application of the Directive. The first 
scenario arises from the Directive’s method for regulating avia-
tion emissions. Aviation emissions are calculated by monitoring 
fuel consumption for the full length of the flight between the 
EU and a non-EU country.166 The Appellate Body has found 
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination to exist when a WTO 
Member State’s justification for a discriminatory measure 
bears no rational connection to, or goes against the stated ob-
jective of, the measure that permitted it to fall under the GATT 
Article XX exceptions.167 Under the EU’s method for monitoring 
aviation emissions, two flights that travel the same distance 
can be responsible for a different number of allowances if one of 
the flights makes an intermediate landing outside the EU, as is 
                                                                                                             
 163. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appel-
late Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 121. 
 164. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 30. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art. 3(b), Annex IV(B). 
 167. Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body 
Report, supra note 22, ¶ 227. The Appellate Body in Brazil–Tyres ruled that 
even though Brazil’s discrimination resulted from its compliance with a rul-
ing from the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal, even a rational decision can be 
characterized as “arbitrary or unjustifiable” if it is not related “to the legiti-
mate objectives pursued by the” measure that lead it to fall within the GATT 
Article XX exceptions. Id. at ¶232. 
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done with connecting flights.168 This may even result in a direct 
flight being responsible for more emissions than an indirect 
flight that traveled a greater distance, but made an intermedi-
ate stop prior to entering the EU.169 This effect would result in 
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination because it erodes the 
relationship between the measure and its GHG reduction goals, 
and may even be used as a means for airlines to evade the 
measure, leading to a net increase in GHG emissions.170 
The second scenario arises if airlines choose to pass the costs 
of complying with the Directive into cargo rates, resulting in 
increased prices for goods that are flown greater distances.171 
Since the Directive only considers the CO2 emissions produced 
in the air transport of the good, this would constitute arbitrary 
and unjustifiable discrimination because the distance flown is 
not indicative of a good’s overall carbon footprint.172 For exam-
ple, an aircraft operator transporting a good with a relatively 
large carbon footprint, but only for a short distance, would be 
responsible for fewer allowances than an aircraft operator 
transporting a good with a minimal carbon footprint that trav-
eled a greater distance.173 Thus, the Directive disregards effi-
ciency improvements that reduce GHG emissions in the pro-
duction and processing methods of goods, which also contribute 
to climate change mitigation.174 Similar to U.S.–Shrimp, this 
overlooks the EU’s declared objective to reduce global GHG 
emissions. 
A determination of “arbitrary discrimination” also looks spe-
cifically at the procedures for implementing a measure and 
whether they take the conditions existing in other countries 
into account while continuing to serve the measure’s policy ob-
jective.175 When the application of a measure disserves the poli-
                                                                                                             
 168. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 145. Bartels, supra note 55, at 458. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Meltzer, supra note 7, at 146. 
 171. Id. at 144–45. 
 172. Id. A “carbon footprint” accounts for either the total CO2, or the total 
CO2 and non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions, for the complete lifecycle of a 
good, from cradle to grave. See Report of the Commission Joint Research Cen-
tre on the ‘Carbon Footprint – what it is and how to measure it’, (2007), avail-
able at http://lct.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pdf-directory/Carbon-footprint.pdf. 
 173. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 144–45. 
 174. See id. at 146. 
 175. See United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Ap-
pellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 177. 
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cy objectives asserted to justify its trade restrictive effect, it 
constitutes “arbitrary discrimination.”176 However, procedural 
and due process safeguards can weigh against a finding of “ar-
bitrary discrimination.” For example, the elements of an oppor-
tunity for exporting members to be heard, and a notification 
and review process were considered to incorporate flexibility 
into a measure and responsiveness to the conditions existing in 
the other country.177 The operation of the Directive relies in 
large part on the direct participation and supply of information 
by aircraft operators.178 Under the Directive, aircraft operators 
submit applications for the free allowances granted by the EU, 
monitor their annual CO2 emissions, and submit information 
on their annual emissions to an accredited verifier.179 In addi-
tion, the executive body of the EU, the European Commission, 
publishes an annual list of aircraft operators whose activities 
are covered by the Directive.180 The direct participation of air-
craft operators in the operation of the Directive will serve to 
alleviate due process and procedural fairness concerns. 
To avoid a finding of “unjustifiable discrimination,” a country 
imposing a unilateral environmental measure must conduct 
across-the-board negotiations towards a multilateral agree-
ment.181 The EU is a major actor in negotiations for interna-
tional climate policy, an area in which it supports multilateral 
                                                                                                             
 176. The U.S.–Shrimp Recourse to Article 21.5 indicates that the Appellate 
Body’s concern with the import ban was its “coercive” nature that disregard-
ed the conditions and views of other member states. Gaines, supra note 20, at 
797; Knox, supra note 94, at 57–58. Since certification under the program 
was not granted to countries that used measures “comparable in effective-
ness” to the U.S. method for protecting turtles, the Appellate Body viewed the 
application of the measure to serve the policy objective of ensuring exporting 
members adopted the exact same regulatory program as the United States, 
and not the declared objective of protecting and conserving sea turtles. Unit-
ed States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body 
Report, supra note 20, ¶ 165. 
 177. See United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Ap-
pellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 177, 180–81. 
 178. See Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art. 3(e), 15. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. art. 18(a); European Commission, Questions and Answers on histor-
ic aviation emissions and the inclusion of aviation in the EU’s Emission Trad-
ing Scheme (EU ETS), at 27 (2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/faq_en.htm. 
 181. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appel-
late Body Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 165–66. 
2013] EU AVIATION DIRECTIVE 1179 
cooperation to address this global environmental problem.182 
The EU plays a leading role in climate policy negotiations with-
in the UNFCCC, and other multilateral forums including the 
ICAO, where it has observer status.183 The EU’s participation 
in negotiations within the ICAO and its continued efforts to 
advance the negotiation process fulfill the negotiation require-
ment.184 
Lastly, whether the Directive is considered a “disguised re-
striction on international trade” depends on the criterion 
adopted by the Appellate Body to make the determination. The 
Directive would likely not be considered a disguised restriction 
on trade under the “publicity test,” because the regulation was 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union.185 
Second, if the Appellate Body collapses the determination of 
whether the Directive constitutes “arbitrary and unjustifiable 
discrimination” or a “disguised restriction on trade” into one 
analysis, the findings above would make it unnecessary to ex-
amine this element separately.186 Under the third criterion, the 
                                                                                                             
 182. Van Schaik & Schunz, supra note 23, at 171, 173. 
 183. Id. at 181; see Oberthür & Kelly, supra note 26, at 35–37. While all 
twenty-seven EU Member States are contracting parties to the Chicago Con-
vention that established the ICAO, the European Union only has observer 
status. “Observer Status” is a means by which intergovernmental organiza-
tions can observe meetings of the WTO. See WTO Agreement, supra note 84, 
art. V; World Trade Organization, Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Min-
isterial Conference and Meetings of the General Council, ch. IV, WT/L/161 
(Jul. 25, 1996). 
 184. Commission Proposal on Derogation form EU ETS, supra note 16, at 
4–5. 
 185. See Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1. 
 186. The Appellate Body in U.S.–Shrimp found it was not necessary to ana-
lyze whether the U.S.’s import ban was a “disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade,” since it was already found to constitute arbitrary and unjustifi-
able discrimination and therefore was not justified under Article XX. United 
States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Re-
port, supra note 20, ¶ 184. It is unclear whether the Appellate Body in U.S.–
Shrimp held either that a measure constituting arbitrary and unjustifiable 
discrimination is a disguised restriction on trade, or that it is not necessary to 
look at the third standard under the chapeau since the measure already con-
stitutes “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination.” While U.S.–Shrimp 
seems to take the former approach, the Appellate Body in U.S.–Gasoline took 
the latter. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gas-
oline, Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 25 (considering a disguised 
restriction on international trade “as embracing restrictions amounting to 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in international trade taken under 
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Directive would not be considered a “disguised restriction on 
international trade,” since the “design, architecture and reveal-
ing structure” of the Directive incorporate the principle of non-
discrimination and a commitment to a multilateral solution.187 
Therefore, if the Appellate Body considers this third element of 
the chapeau separately, it will find that the Directive does not 
constitute a “disguised restriction on international trade.” 
With the deferment of the Directive’s application to non-EU 
airlines, it remains to be seen whether the Directive will incor-
porate sufficient flexibility and sensitivity to the conditions in 
other states to withstand scrutiny under the chapeau. This is 
because it is the application of the measure and not the EU’s 
expressed intentions that dictate whether the measure will 
constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.188 Howev-
er, the EU will not be able to avoid the “arbitrary and unjusti-
fiable discrimination” that is implicit in the application of the 
Directive. 
While the Appellate Body in U.S.–Shrimp found the United 
States’ “rigid and inflexible” measure to constitute “arbitrary 
and unjustifiable discrimination,” the United States was able 
to bring its measure into conformity with the WTO by revising 
its guidelines.189 Therefore, if the EU were to revise the Di-
                                                                                                             
the guise of a measure formally within the terms of an exception listed in 
Article XX”). 
 187. See generally Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1. The princi-
ples of non-discrimination are seen in the conditional exemption to the Di-
rective. Id. art. 25(a). In addition, the Directive expresses the EU’s continued 
commitment to working towards a multilateral agreement for aviation emis-
sions. Id. at 17. 
 188. See United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Ap-
pellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 160; European Communities–Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos–Containing Products, Panel Report, supra 
note 155, ¶ 8.226; GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to GATT 
Article XX, Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g), supra note 155, ¶ 65; Report of the 
Panel, United States–Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from 
Canada, ¶ 4.8, L/5198 (Dec. 22, 1981), GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91 
(1982), noted in GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to GATT 
Article XX, Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g), supra note 155, ¶¶ 80–81. 
 189. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products Recourse 
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, Appellate Body Report, supra note 
152, ¶ 153. The United States made several changes to its original program 
in the revised guidelines in an attempt to take the different conditions in the 
exporting countries into account in the implementation of its measure. First, 
the United States amended its criteria for certifying exporting members pro-
grams to protect endangered sea turtles to accept programs that were “com-
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rective to remedy the elements that constitute “arbitrary and 
unjustifiable discrimination,” it is likely an Appellate Body 
would consider the revised measure to fall within GATT Article 
XX. Yet even if the Directive is justified under GATT Article 
XX, the EU should refrain from imposing its program on non-
EU airlines in the absence of a multilateral agreement on the 
regulation of aviation emissions. 
III. MULTILATERALISM AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE GLOBAL 
CLIMATE REGIME 
A. The Multilateral vs. Unilateral Approach 
The WTO’s preference for multilateral environmental agree-
ments190 is based on the nature of environmental problems, 
which transcend geographic boundaries and require the efforts 
of more than one country to provide effective solutions.191 Uni-
                                                                                                             
parable in effectiveness” to the use of Turtle Excluder Devices. Id. ¶ 5. Sec-
ond, the Revised Guidelines also allowed certification for exporting countries 
that trawl for shrimp in waters where there is no risk for capture of sea tur-
tles, or whose means of shrimp fishing do not put sea turtles at risk, such as 
artisanal shrimp fishing methods. Id. ¶ 7. 
 190. Both, the United Nations and the WTO incorporate the principle of 
multilateralism into their conception of environmental governance. In the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, the U.N. opted to support an 
“international consensus” to address global environmental issues, and explic-
itly listed the avoidance of unilateral measures as one of its principles. U.N. 
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development, Princ. 12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992); 
See, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, supra 
note 20, ¶168. Similarly, the WTO’s Agenda 21 Decision on Trade and Envi-
ronment advises against unilateral action, supporting an international ap-
proach to trans-boundary environmental problems. U.N. Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development, Agenda 21, ¶¶ 1.1–2.1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 
(1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21]; See United States–Import Prohibition of Cer-
tain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 168. WTO 
Director-General Pascal Lamy elaborated on the importance of a multilateral 
approach to addressing climate change in his statement that “[a] multilateral 
agreement that includes all major emitters would be the best placed interna-
tional instrument to guide other instruments, such as the WTO.” Pascal 
Lamy, A Consensual International Accord on Climate Change is Needed, 
Temporary Committee on Climate Change, European Parliament (May 29, 
2008), quoted in, HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 20, at 99. 
 191. Cf., United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Ap-
pellate Body Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 168 (noting that the species of turtles 
the United States sought to protect in U.S.–Shrimp were migratory, so solely 
implementing a domestic measure would not have served the objectives of the 
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lateral environmental measures with extraterritorial effects 
run the risk of negating the rights of other WTO Members by 
disregarding the conditions existing in those countries, as well 
as their views on how to address the common environmental 
problem.192 When such unilateral measures are imposed by one 
of the larger economic powers, such as the United States in 
U.S.–Shrimp, they can serve to effectively coerce less-powerful 
countries into adopting their standards.193 
A second concern with the authorization of the Directive, as a 
unilateral environmental measure, is its potential to lead to 
fragmentation of measures to address aviation emissions.194 
This fragmentation, with different programs adopted by indi-
vidual countries, will create a “political maelstrom,”195 and in-
stigate repeat challenges within the WTO on whether the im-
position of these measures on members, without their consent, 
is based on protectionist motives.196 Such challenges will create 
a period of uncertainty and increased tensions due to these 
competing regulatory measures, not only freezing any forward 
action in efforts to address climate change, but also undermin-
ing the effectiveness of these measures as tools to address envi-
ronmental problems.197 
In contrast, a multilateral environmental agreement is an 
expression of consensus among international actors that can 
shift current conceptions of the value and importance of ad-
dressing global climate change.198 Through this shift, a set of 
                                                                                                             
policy since efforts in the importing member would be effectively nullified by 
the lack of regulation in other countries). 
 192. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appel-
late Body Report supra note 20, at ¶181; see Knox, supra note 94, at 58. 
 193. See Gregory Shaffer & Daniel Bodansky, Transnationalism, Unilater-
alism, and International Law, 1 TRANSNATIONAL ENVTL. L. 31, 33–34, 37–38 
(2012) (noting that the extraterritorial application of environmental stand-
ards by “dominant market actors” oftentimes leads other states to adopt simi-
lar standards, contributing to a “growing convergence of environmental laws” 
internationally); Gaines, supra note 20, at 797. 
 194. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 20, at 96. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 193, at 40–41. 
 197. Id. at 39–41. 
 198. Van Schaik & Schunz, supra note 23, at 171. See also, Cass R. Sun-
stein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 910 (1996) (ar-
guing that laws expressing social values and shifting “social norms” can in-
fluence peoples’ personal conceptions of what is considered acceptable and the 
way those people value certain goods). 
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values and principles emerge that redefine what is considered 
the appropriate response to international environmental prob-
lems.199 Multilateral environmental agreements can stimulate 
the spread and acceptance of environmental legal norms in in-
ternational environmental law, which then can then be “down-
loaded,” or replicated into national and regional regulatory 
programs. 200  Even non-binding multilateral environmental 
agreements can play a role in developing “recognition of envi-
ronmental values,” which in the WTO context can serve as 
guidance for panels and appellate bodies in their assessment of 
climate change measures. 201  While unilateral environmental 
measures can contribute to the creation of environmental 
norms, they also tend to instigate “significant diplomatic ten-
sions, resentment and concern.”202 Resistance to unilateral en-
vironmental measures can undermine their effectiveness and 
dilute or eliminate their ability to influence “norms of behav-
ior.”203 
In response to criticism on the unilateral nature of the Di-
rective, members of the European Commission expressed con-
cern that other countries’ demands for a multilateral climate 
agreement merely disguise their efforts to prevent full imple-
mentation of the Directive and to forestall action in other fo-
rums, such as the ICAO.204 Proponents of unilateral environ-
mental trade measures argue that such measures can be used 
as a tool to pressure other countries to change their policies; as 
one author has put it, “to deny a regime the benefits of unilat-
                                                                                                             
 199. Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Envi-
ronmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615, 617 (2009); Van Schaik & Schunz, su-
pra note 23, at 171. Sunstein defines “norms” as “social attitudes of approval 
and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be 
done.” Sunstein, supra note 198, at 914. These norms can also be codified into 
law. Id. at 914–15. 
 200. Yang & Percival, supra note 199, at 645–66. 
 201. Id. at 646. In resolving disputes involving trade and the environment, 
the Appellate Body has historically examined the plain meaning of the text of 
the GATT, and when the text is unclear, resorts to substantive principles 
held in “environmental treaties and declarations” that have received wide-
spread political support. Knox, supra note 94, at 3, 50–59. 
 202. Yang & Percival, supra note 199, at 648–49. 
 203. Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 193, at 40–41. 
 204. Remarks of Mr. Hahn, EUR. PARL. DEB. (O-0127) (Sep. 21, 2010), avail-
able at, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+CRE+20100921+ITEM-015+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN. 
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eral action is to deny the prospect of change.”205 Unilateral en-
vironmental measures are also a method for expediently pursu-
ing solutions to environmental problems, such as climate 
change, in which quick and effective action is critical.206 In con-
trast, multilateral negotiations threaten to exacerbate the in-
expediency with which environmental solutions are formulated, 
as the negotiation process is characteristically slow, expensive, 
politicized, and typically results in only aspirational standards 
rather than binding commitments.207 Therefore, a decision in 
the WTO to block the EU from including non-EU airlines in the 
Directive may effectively strip the EU of its ability to protect 
its domestic environment.208 
However, recent developments within the ICAO show that a 
global market-based measure for aviation emissions may be on 
the horizon. In 2009, the ICAO endorsed an action plan that 
included aspirational goals for fuel efficiency and metrics to 
measure progress.209 The following year, the 37th ICAO As-
sembly resolved to achieve a “global annual average fuel effi-
ciency improvement of 2 percent until 2020” and encouraged 
member states to submit action plans on how to achieve this 
goal.210 The ICAO also resolved to develop a framework for 
market-based measures for international aviation to be re-
viewed at the 38th ICAO Assembly.211 Since the 37th Assem-
bly, the ICAO has agreed to a CO2 metric system and has 
formed a high-level group to address policy issues relating to 
the feasibility of a market-based mechanism for international 
aviation.212 Most recently, the ICAO reached an agreement on 
certification procedures to complement aircraft CO2 emissions 
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standards.213 The practical steps the ICAO has taken towards a 
market-based mechanism for aviation emissions are indicative 
of an “alignment of political will” within the industry to come to 
an agreement on emissions reductions.214 
When considering whether the EU should continue to unilat-
erally enforce the Directive or defer to the multilateral process, 
the likelihood that the Directive will create environmental 
norms must be balanced against the likelihood that the meas-
ure will spur greater resistance and undermine the legitimacy 
of the global climate regime.215 Although the EU deferred the 
enforcement of the Directive to non-EU airlines to allow addi-
tional time for a multilateral agreement within the ICAO, the 
EU will reinstate the enforcement of the non-EU airline’s obli-
gations under the Directive if the ICAO 38th Assembly does 
not make “clear and sufficient”216 progress on such an agree-
ment.217 However, even if sufficient progress is not made at the 
38th ICAO Assembly, the EU should refrain from reinstating 
the application of the Directive to non-EU airlines. 
B. The European Union’s Role in the International Climate 
Change Regime 
The EU should continue to suspend the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the Directive, because instead of creating environmen-
tal norms, the Directive will put the legitimacy of the WTO at 
risk and undermine the utility of unilateral environmental 
trade measures as a tool to address environmental problems. 
While the EU has the potential to serve as a “norm entrepre-
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neur” and transfer its environmental values to its trade part-
ners, it has yet to “successfully upload these norms,” or their 
underlying principles “to the global level.”218 This was seen in 
the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol and in the negotiations 
leading up to the Copenhagen Accord, where the EU played a 
leading role in driving negotiations forward, but failed to con-
vince the other parties to the negotiations to adopt its positions 
on how to address global climate change.219 
The EU has a pattern of getting international actors to the 
negotiating table, but once there, exerting minimal influence in 
persuading other countries to buy into its position on global 
environmental governance. There are several explanations for 
the gap between the EU’s environmental goals and its ability to 
transfer these norms to other international actors. The first is 
a result of a conflict of values between the EU and other key 
actors in climate negotiations.220 The EU is a “norm-driven ac-
tor,” and shapes its climate policy around its concerns for pro-
tecting its “environmental, economic, and security-related” in-
terests in the long-term, even if it is necessary to incur costs in 
the short-term.221  In contrast, countries such as the United 
States, Japan, and four of the larger developing economies, 
Brazil, South Africa, India and China (“BASIC”), are “interest-
driven actors,” focused on protecting their short-term economic 
interests.222 
These ideological differences imbue uncertainty and distrust 
into the negotiating process that can lead parties to become 
suspicious of their opponents potential ulterior motives.223 This 
results in a politicization of climate change discussions that 
can lead to a stalemate when major actors become reluctant to 
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compromise their objectives.224 The uncertainty inherent in in-
ternational negotiations is exacerbated by the unilateral ac-
tions of a single country when it is not clear if a self-interested 
goal is at play.225  However, the proponent of the unilateral 
measure can alleviate this concern when the measure includes 
some degree of sacrifice.226 Showing a “degree of sacrifice” in 
climate negotiations has been problematic for the EU, as seen 
with the Kyoto Protocol where the EU’s required GHG emis-
sions reductions were less than one-third of the reductions that 
would be required of the United States if it ratified the agree-
ment.227 
The shift in the political landscape of climate negotiations 
since the Kyoto Protocol also helps to explain the EU’s struggle 
to upload its norms to the global level. The United States and 
the EU played a dominant role during the formation of the 
UNFCCC, and the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, as the 
countries responsible for the majority of CO2 emissions from 
developed countries.228 However, by the fifteenth Conference of 
the Parties to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen, the BASIC coun-
tries had joined the EU and the United States as major players 
at the negotiating table.229 China, in particular, has become an 
“indispensable actor in climate politics,” in that its CO2 emis-
sions are expected to exceed the U.S.’s emissions by 75% by 
2030.230 In contrast, the EU hopes to cut CO2 emissions by 40% 
of 1990 levels by 2030.231 The shift of the political order in cli-
mate negotiations tends to erode the EU’s influence over the 
process. 
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Despite this, the EU still plays an important role in setting 
the climate agenda.232 While the EU is not always successful in 
delivering on its ambitious aspirations in climate change nego-
tiations, it often gains a first-mover advantage by its ability to 
use its norms to define the problem at issue and propose a solu-
tion.233 In addition, the EU has been successful as a “blocking 
power” in preventing attempts to renegotiate established prin-
ciples and goals in international negotiations.234 The EU is like-
ly to continue to be a major player in international climate ne-
gotiations for several reasons. First, the EU retains a competi-
tive advantage with its significant trading bloc of twenty-seven 
member states.235 This significance is driven home by the EU’s 
“trading and investment relationships” with the United States, 
which consist of “nearly 40 percent of world trade.”236 Second, 
the EU is seen as a balancing force in the future distribution of 
power between multiple nations, such as China, Russia, and 
the United States.237 And third, the EU is particularly suited to 
continue structuring climate negotiations and advocate for in-
ternational cooperation due to the strength of its own domestic 
environmental policy.238 
The debate over the EU Directive is already highly politi-
cized, as indicated by the challenge to the Directive before the 
European Court of Justice, and the U.S. legislation prohibiting 
U.S. airlines from complying with the Directive. In addition, 
the United States, India, China, and twenty other countries 
adopted the Moscow Joint Declaration to urge the EU to cease 
application of the Aviation Directive to non-EU aircraft opera-
tors and threatened future legal challenges before the ICAO 
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and the WTO.239 If the resolution of the conflict over the Di-
rective is transferred to the WTO, the Appellate Body will be 
forced to decide on the balance between trade rights and 
measures to address climate change, a decision upon which its 
members have failed to come to an agreement.240 
A judicial resolution of the dispute over the Directive would 
create a lose-lose situation. If the WTO strikes down the Di-
rective, it would receive severe disapproval from the EU and 
environmental organizations that support the Directive.241 In 
addition, a ruling against the Directive would undermine the 
EU’s role as a leader in climate policy, a role that has been cru-
cial in driving international climate negotiations forward.242 If 
the Appellate Body were to uphold the Directive, however, the 
decision would be met with widespread opposition, undermin-
ing political support for the WTO as a trade institution and al-
so undermining its legitimacy in balancing states’ interests.243 
This may also instigate offended members to take action to ex-
clude the EU from future efforts to reach a multilateral agree-
ment.244 Both outcomes would serve as a major disruption in 
the continuation and success of climate negotiations, with cata-
strophic consequences for the climate.245 
CONCLUSION 
Global climate change remains a formidable challenge, with 
the window for action quickly closing.246 While an international 
consensus has formed that global temperature increases must 
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be limited to 2° Celsius to prevent “dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate,”247 there still remains a signifi-
cant gap between countries’ voluntary commitments and the 
reductions necessary to prevent global temperature increase 
above this threshold.248 Even though the EU’s Directive consti-
tutes a step toward addressing this environmental challenge, it 
will ultimately serve as a setback in efforts to address global 
climate change. 
Enforcement of the Directive on non-EU airlines will exacer-
bate the already severe tensions surrounding the measure, 
driving the dispute into the WTO for judicial resolution. In-
stead of creating positive environmental norms, the Directive’s 
failure before the WTO would undermine the use of unilateral 
environmental measures with extraterritorial effects as a tool 
for climate policy, as well as other non-climate related envi-
ronmental measures. Though the WTO has yet to use GATT 
Article XX to balance international trade with efforts to combat 
climate change, it is unwise to use the Directive as a means to 
define this relationship. A multilateral environmental agree-
ment for aviation emissions is on the horizon, and even if the 
38th ICAO Assembly fails to establish a market-based mecha-
nism for these emissions, the EU should abstain from the ex-
tra-territorial application of the measure to preserve the cli-
mate negotiation process. 
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